Clinical practice depends on the patient trusting the doctor. That in turn depends on the degree of faith that the patient has in the doctor's ability or willingness to maintain the secrecy of confidential information freely given. The patient knows that any information so volunteered will be seen and possibly used by many different health professionals, but he gives the required information anyway because he has faith in the intentions of the staff concerned and in the doctor's authority in the control of information spread.
There is a snag. Benjamin Franklin rather cynically said that "three may keep a secret if two of them are dead." It is hard to maintain a confidence when it has to be passed between people who have no interest in whether it is known or not. Carelessness breeds inadvertent publicity. Dull routine may prompt excessive interest in the private lives of others and damaging anecdotes may enliven a boring job.
Leaks and other unauthorised disclosures of private information are common in commerce and industry for the relations between those enterprises and their employees are markedly different from that between a health service and its staff. The latter are believed to be motivated by more than a need to earn a wage or salary and this protects the institution and its patients from abuse. Yet the health service does suffer from breaches of confidence.
Advent of the computer
Before the computer arrived it was difficult for staff to obtain private information. Manual records, even if legible, take time to rifle through and are seldom stored in an order that would be of use to a would be snoop. Electronically stored records, however, are instantly available to the initiated in whatever order or format he chooses at the press of a button. Worse still, while the dedicated spy must go to a central record filing store to gain access to manual records, he can call electronic records to him provided that he can tap into the appropriate network. As any cinema goer or television watcher knows tapping in is child's play. All the potential information seeker needs is some basic computer skill, a computer, and either a marked curiosity or criminal intent.
Computer crime is on the increase. This is not startling given the ease with which miscreants can gain access to private information and the amount of such information storable in any one system. Transfer of data is so simple with modern technology that many computer systems are designed to store more information than the user is likely to need and to transfer such data quickly and efficiently to remote sites. Users have found it cheaper to use small computer installations themselves, drawing on private information in large data banks held by other organisations as required. Economy has led to the widespread practice of sharing data. This, too, helps the computer criminal who wants to enter the system. This might be considered irrelevant in the health service but it has data banks (remote and local), computer networks, and access points, though the National Health Service does not usually have data with obvious profit potential, except possibly for blackmail.
Most computer crime, however, is not committed for personal gain. No less than 85% of such crime is perpetrated by employees, mostly because of malice towards the organisation, the boss, or an immediate supervisor. The health service is clearly not invulnerable.
The development of computer technology resulted in the separation of the ideal of data security from that of confidentiality. Whereas data security relates to the way in which information is protected from unauthorised eyes, confidentiality concerns the way in which decisions about disclosure of information are made. Thus, confidentiality is concerned with who is allowed access to particular bits of data while data security is concerned with stopping anyone else joining in. In some respects it is an artificial distinction but it is none the less important, if only because of the implementation of the Data Protection Act.
Parliament was concerned at the electronic revolution and was determined to do whatever it could to protect sensitive information about particular individuals. The 1984 Act is the outcome, seeking to encourage good practice in data management, to set minimum standards of practice, and to enforce such standards through criminal law. In addition, the Act provides for access by the data subject to certain categories of information concerning himself. To achieve this eight principles of data protection have been developed:
(1) Personal data shall be obtained and processed fairly and lawfully.
(2) Personai data shall be held only for specified and lawful purposes.
(3) Personal data shall be disclosed only in pursuance of those specified and lawful purposes. The Data Protection Act will undoubtedly help to discourage people from breaching the privacy of electronically held data. It will not, sadly, have so much impact on manual records, which are not protected by this or any other Act. Health records of whatever variety, though, need to be kept secure. Clinicians, therefore, have a dual obligation to their patients: they must abide by the new law on electronic files, and they must secure and protect information kept on manual systems. It makes sense to combine these in one task, and to check that their management of information conforms with the new Act regardless of whether or not it is electronically based, for the principles at stake are the same for both types of record.
Data protection officers
Most health authorities will appoint a data protection officer, whose prime job will be to ensure that electronic records are secure but whose remit would undoubtedly extend to manual records. They will be backed by a district data protection committee composed of major users. At hospital or practice level, however, someone will have to take on the responsibility of ensuring the confidentiality of data-that is, data custodians-and its security-that is, data or systems administrators-for each system. In a clinical setting the data custodian will probably be a clinician and the system administrator will probably also be a clinician.
The main tasks of the data custodian in promoting confidentiality are:
(1) To produce, maintain, and update a code of practice for his system, which covers the routines by which authorised personnel can access personal data.
(2) To authorise any alteration to the machinery or routines comprising his system where these have any impact on data protection-for example, the use of different types of terminals that may link with other systems not previously included and the changing of the format of staff access codes.
(3) To authorise access to files, in part or whole, on one occasion or continuously. (4) To monitor the use of the system, including how authorised personnel use the data to which they are allowed access.
(5) To negotiate the release of information into data banks for which other data custodians carry responsibility.
To support the data custodian the system administrator's main tasks are: (1) To ensure that the data custodian's code ofpractice covers all aspects of data security including (a) the physical security of source documents, computer hardware, and printout or other hard copy-for example, magnetic tape; (b) access codes or passwords to the system, its software, and its various levels of data, and (c) security policing techniques such as "time out" and continuous user logging.
(2) To monitor the operation of the code of practice. (3) To issue appropriate access codes or passwords reflecting the conditions of authorisation to those persons authorised by the data custodian to obtain access to any part of the system.
(4) To settle any disputes in the use of data.
(5) To ensure that the system is registered with the data protection registrar or the district data protection committee ifexempt from registration under the Act.
(6) To ensure that the system operates within the Data Protection Act. Although not specifically his task, the system administrator should also ensure that there is a data custodian for his system. Two things are clear. Firstly, the two tasks outlined above overlap quite considerably. The two officers must be able to work together comfortably and cooperatively. Secondly, it is apparent that the emphasis is on compu-ter data. There is no reason, however, why the concepts concerned cannot spread to manual systems and, indeed, there is every reason to encourage them to do so.
Clinicians must be prepared to enter the arena of data protection by playing their full part as data protection officers. In fairness it hardly requires a great deal of effort apart from writing the code of practice and even that, as we shall now see, is a relatively simple task, especially for manual records.
Guidelines for a code of practice NAME OF THE SYSTEM This sounds a trifle unnecessary but it is astonishing how often people want to refer to particular files and have difficulty because they do not know how to describe them. Since many files relate to chlnical information on patients it is important for everyone concerned to be able to identify the component parent files. The file should be named, but in such a way that its use is fairly obvious.
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Subfiles within the system should be identified and named, thus enabling all the users to specify additional features ofa subfile's code of practice rather than writing it all out again. A main file labelled "Barnsley case registers" can therefore have several subfiles including, for example "Mental handicap register," "Physically disabled register," "Solvent abuse register," "Incontinence register," and so on.
It may help to represent the hierarchy diagrammatically so as to show the relation between subfiles and the main files.
PURPOSE OF THE CODE
Most codes are simply to prevent unauthorised access to the data system and to define criteria of authorisation, though some additional purposes may be defined for special cases. All purposes should be aimed at maintaining public confidence in the system's ability to protect sensitive data.
If the health authority concerned has a formal policy on confidentiality and data protection or both then the code must conform to that. Does it? If so does it say so explicitly? There should be no need to mention the guide to the Data Protection Act,2 the Steering Group on Health Services Information's code of practice,3 or Departmental guidance,4 though where the authority's policy is unwritten this might be advisable.
Does this section include a statement that all employees are obliged to maintain secrecy, with unauthorised disclosure being subject to disciplinary action, and are the disciplinary sanctions outlined briefly?
DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM
If the system is computerised in any way, shape, or form both the machinery-that is, hardware-and the programs-that is, software-used should be specified. This will be needed by district officers charged with ensuring data protection on a district wide basis. It will also be useful to avoid duplicate purchases of widely applicable software and to plan for equipment replacement on a controlled basis.
Are any parts of the system utilising shared facilities? For example, colour line printers are usually shared by several separate systems while most visual display units operate several electronic systems. In such cases it is necessary to define which systems each shared piece of equipment belongs to so that the relevant systems administrator and data custodian may be fully aware of their obligations for ensuring its safety and security. It may also be useful in debiting the appropriate budget when the system is replaced.
Does the system allow other systems to use part of its hardware or software? If others are allowed to share the machinery or programmes these must be identified by name. This does not mean only taking source data from another party and storing or processing it for them, a circumstance in which the user may be acting as a computer bureau and so must obtain advice from his district data protection officer. I am referring to the position where other systems may be using your line printers, visual display units, etc. If the system is a particular person's responsibility then he must specify who else can use parts of it for their own ends; it is up to the district data protection committee to ensure that this is acceptable.
Special problems occur with systems that share data with other systems. These other systems will have to state how they are to use these data in their own code of practice, but your own code should specify the uses for which you have collected the data in question. There will need to be a good deal of collaboration with other users over these important questions.
Where data or software are shared some free exchange of information between systems-that is, interfacing-will be necessary. This may be partial or complete, one way or two way, temporary or permanent. Interfacing may be effected by batch processing of data held on magnetic tape, magnetic disc, punched cards, etc; intermittent-operated by opening a switch on the donor system to permit data disclosure or software sharing; or permanent -tied into a network of electronic installations. If either of the latter two is used there is less control of who can use the shared material; anyone with the appropriate passwords will be able to obtain access to the material regardless of which systems they operate, provided that their system also participates in the same network. If this applies to a system that you are responsible for produce a network diagram, enlisting the aid of your district data protection officer, so that the district data protection committee can satisfy itself on the security of its networks and computer interfaces. DESCRIBE Within Wales the progress of these policies and priorities are being watched with interest. Health promotion has received a boost in the establishment of "Heartbeat Wales," a project designed to inform the population about the benefits of exercise, of not smoking, and of a healthy diet in coronary prevention. Local services in some areas are being developed in close cooperation with the private sector. Two districts now have renal dialysis units funded commercially, but using NHS services such as catering and laboratory facilities as well as NHS consultant expertise. After only two months in operation for one of these units it is too early for valid conclusions but so far there have been no serious problems, and the medical staff concerned praise the sensitivity of managers who conducted the delicate negotiations before the unit was established.
A great deal of money has been spent in Wales over the past decade on capital projects, not all of which have been completed as originally planned. One of the new district general hospitals-designed in two phases to reduce the number of sites from which the acute services were being provided from four to one-is now unlikely ever to contain all the acute specialties. Instead three sites will remain, and the remaining capital to fund the transfer of one of the major acute specialties to the new site-five years after the first phase openedhas to be found by the district.
The commitment to the expansion of community hospitals-a major part of the text of this document-has been acted on. Many districts have seen the enlargement of existing community hospitals, the conversion of defunct maternity homes or distant parts of the district general hospital, and the building of new community hospitals spread throughout the district and providing an increasing proportion of the care. Before general practitioners become too complacent about their place in the Welsh health services, however, there is a warning that the green paper may alter the Secretary of State's priorities for the family practitioner services.
Policies and Pri-orities for Health Services in Wales is available from the Welsh Office, Cathays Park, Cardiff.
Selected list successful, according to Secretary of State
The selected list scheme was running successfully and was on target to save £75 million a year, the Secretary of State for Social Services claimed in the House of Commons on 12 November. The scheme had, he said, proved to be a sensible way of saving money on the drugs bill and ensured that extra resources went on the health services. Asked why he had allowed the General Medical Services Committee to prevent other doctors from using an appeal mechanism, he replied: "In view of the history of the selected list and the controversy that it aroused in the medical profession it seems rather foolhardy to seek to impose an appeal mechanism on the medical profession, which does not appear to want it." Mr Norman Fowler said that another benefit had been that some drug prices had come down appreciably.
